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BUSINESS LAW—CORPORATE PURPOSE AND BENEFIT CORPORATIONS—MAKING BENEFIT
CORPORATION LEGISLATION WORK FOR SOCIALLY MINDED INVESTORS
Cody McKinney*
I. INTRODUCTION
When it comes to business, there is money in morality. In 2018, according to The Forum
for Sustainable and Responsible Investment 1, sustainable and responsible investment assets
expanded to $12.0 trillion in the United States. 2 However, what happens when a company fails—
or potentially fails—to follow through with its promise of social impact? What recourse do
investors have? The sale of Ben & Jerry's to the mega-corporation Unilever in 2000 offers some
insight. 3
Ben & Jerry's began as a Vermont company in 1978 and became an exemplar social
enterprise. 4 Ben & Jerry's built a reputation for being environmentally conscious, taking care of
its employees, and ensuring that its dairy sources operated humanely. 5 Ben & Jerry's earned this
reputation through practices such as rarely firing employees. 6 Ben Cohen and Jerry Greenfield, the
founders and majority shareholders of Ben & Jerry's, were as concerned with improving the
community as making a profit. 7

*Cody McKinney is JD and MPS Candidate at the University of Arkansas Little Rock William H. Bowen
1
A membership association that advances sustainable, responsible, and impact investing.
2
The Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment, Report on US Sustainable, Responsible and
Impact Investing Trends, USSIF (Oct. 31, 2018, 7:50:42 AM), https://www.ussif.org/blog_home.asp?Display=118.
3
Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, The Truth about Ben and Jerry’s, STANFORD SOC. INNOVATION REV. 39,
40-41 (2012).
4
Id. at 39.
5
Id. at 39.
6
David Gelles, How the Social Mission of Ben & Jerry’s Survived Being Gobbled Up, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/23/business/how-ben-jerrys-social-mission-survived-being-gobbledup.html.
7
Page & Katz, supra note 3, at 39.
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Unilever is one of the world's largest consumer goods companies. 8 In 2000, Unilever was
the owner of commonly known brands such as Vaseline, Lipton Tea, and Ragu. 9 Additionally,
Unilever was the world's largest ice cream maker. 10
With Ben & Jerry's sale to Unilever, some shareholders feared that the financial bottomline would become the only concern in Ben & Jerry's future. 11 Investors had no guarantee Ben &
Jerry's would continue to be the environmentally, socioeconomically, and animal-friendly
corporation they had invested in initially. 12 This problem led to Vermont becoming the second
state to create benefit corporation legislation in 2011. 13
There is a long-standing legal debate about a business's duty to maximize shareholders'
profits. Regardless of this debate, shareholder profit maximization is no longer the singular
purpose of all for-profit businesses. Whether the commentary on profit maximization in Dodge v.
Ford and eBay v. Newmark is dicta or law, the creation and adoption of benefit corporations,
flexible purpose corporations, and low-profit limited liability corporations have provided a
framework for corporations to pursue more than just profit. 14 Still, how courts will enforce a
corporation's purpose outside of profit maximization has yet to be tested. This note analyzes
criticism of benefit corporation legislation and argues that The Benefit Corporation Act 15 adds to
the legal landscape in Arkansas because, although traditional corporations are free to practice
corporate social responsibility and pursue some social purpose, benefit corporation legislation

8

Id.
Martha M. Hamilton, Unilever to Buy Ben & Jerry’s, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2000, 11:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/unilever-to-buy-ben-and-jerrys/2018/09/24/90a52f84-c020-11e8-be77516336a26305_story.html.
10
Id.
11
Page & Katz, supra note 3, at 40.
12
Id.
13
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §§ 21.01–08 (West 2020).
14
Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. REV.
269, 269–70 (2013).
15
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-36-101 to -401 (West 2020).
9
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builds the foundation for shareholders to hold companies accountable for how they pursue public
purposes. This note also acknowledges the weakness of the Arkansas Benefit Corporation Act with
respect to holding benefit corporations accountable for serving their stated public purposes.
Nonetheless, this note argues that applying the doctrine of parens patriae and encouraging benefit
corporations to adopt a quasi-poison pill provision could significantly correct that shortcoming.
Part II of this note addresses the origin and history of benefit corporations. It then reviews
suggested enforcement strategies to ensure benefit corporations are fulfilling their public purposes.
Part III examines the role benefit corporations play in Arkansas and how the benefit corporation
legislation stands up against criticism and examines how the application of the doctrine of parens
patriae could be applied to benefit corporations, flexible purpose corporations, and low-profit
limited liability corporations. Further, this note recommends the adoption of a quasi-poison pill to
strengthen the true value of benefit corporation legislation and to allow shareholders an avenue
with which to hold entities they invest in accountable for the public purposes the entities claim to
pursue.
II. BACKGROUND
The question of whether corporations exist to maximize shareholders' wealth is at the center
of an ongoing argument in the United States. Some legal scholars point to the lack of cited authority
in the landmark cases to dispel the shareholder's wealth maximization requirement as a myth.16
Other legal scholars claim that a proper reading of the case law clearly establishes the wealth
maximization duty. 17 Regardless of which side is correct, there has been a growing social
movement to acknowledge alternative corporate purposes beyond that of profit maximization. 18 A

16

Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 166 (2008).
David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 181, 187–94 (2014).
18
Fredrick H. Alexander, The Capital Markets and Benefit Corporations, ABA (July 20, 2016),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2016/07/05_
17
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majority of states have adopted a benefit corporation, flexible purpose corporation, and low-profit
limited liability corporation legislation based on model legislation written by B Lab. 19 The model
legislation, and the statues adopted based on the model legislation, expressly provide for an entity
to pursue public benefits in addition to shareholders' profits and creates a right of action that
shareholders can utilize to ensure that the corporation's stated public benefit is pursued. 20 However,
the right of action laid out in the model legislation falls short of being effective and scholarly
efforts are underway to remedy the shortcoming. 21
As this note discusses below, the private right of action created by benefit corporation
legislation is limited by the business judgment rule. 22 Under the business judgment rule, courts
will accede to the business judgment of corporate executives, 23 making it likely that any
explanation given by benefit corporation executives for not pursuing the general or specific public
purposes will be protected under the rule.
The non-profit sector has done its part to develop a solution. B Lab has created a private
certification for businesses that meet a certain level of social impact and gives the businesses they
certify the designation of a B Corp. 24 To achieve the B Corp certification, businesses must
complete B Lab's "B Impact Assessment" and integrate stakeholder consideration into the

alexander/.
19

Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 381, 381 (2017); B Lab is a nonprofit
that serves the global movement of people using business as a force for good. See About B Lab, B LAB,
https://bcorporation.net/about-b-lab (last visited Nov. 14, 2020).
20
Model
Benefit
Corporation
Legislation,
BENEFIT
CORP.
(Apr.
17,
2017),
https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf.
21
Jaime Lee, Benefit Corporations: A Proposal for Assessing Liability in Benefit Enforcement
Proceedings, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 4, 1075, 1096 (2018).
22
See infra Section II D.
23
Id.
24
See How to Become a B Corp, B LAB, https://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/howto-become-ab-corp (last visited Feb. 27, 2020).
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governance structure of their businesses. 25 The "B Impact Assessment" analyzes how a company
interacts with its employees, customers, community, and environment. 26
A.

Corporate Purpose Historically and Modern Alternatives
In the United States, the pervading notion is that a corporation exists to maximize

shareholders' profits. The 1919 case Dodge v. Ford from the Michigan Supreme Court is a
landmark shareholder wealth maximization case. 27 In Dodge, the court asserted in dictum that forprofit corporations exist exclusively for the benefit of their shareholders and that a director's
primary interest should be maximizing shareholders' profit. 28 Absent Dodge, there is little
authority on the matter. 29 It is essential to note Dodge is a state case, and no federal cases have
addressed profit maximization since Dodge was decided. More recently, in eBay v. Newmark, a
case primarily about minority shareholder rights, the Supreme Court of Delaware, arguably the
court most proficient in handling business litigation, reaffirmed the duty of corporations to
maximize shareholders' profits. 30 Strangely in both eBay and Dodge, the courts fail to provide
authority for their positions on the existence of a duty to maximize shareholders' profits. 31 Many
scholars have discussed this lack of authority, urging their peers to stop teaching profit
maximization as law and, instead, acknowledge it as dicta. 32 Of course, there is an argument
against profit maximization as dicta. The majority view is that profit maximization is settled law. 33

25

Id.
Id.
27
M. Todd Henderson, Everything Old Is New Again: Lessons from Dodge v. Ford Motor Company 1–2
(John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 373, 2007).
28
Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
29
Stout, supra note 16, at 166.
30
eBay Domestic Holdings Inc v. Newark, 16 A.3d 1, 6 (Del. Ch. 2010).
31
Yosifon, supra note 17, at 187–88; David B. Guenther, The Strange Case of the Missing Doctrine and the
“Odd Exercise” of eBay: Why Exactly Must Corporations Maximize Profits to Shareholders?, 12 VA. L. & BUS. REV.
3 427, 434–35 (2018).
32
Stout, supra note 16, at 166.
33
Yosifon, supra note 17, at 181.
26
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One scholarly argument is that, although no binding authority is cited in Dodge v. Ford, proper
readings of Unocal v. Mesa 34 and Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 35 more
clearly establish that the law requires directors to maximize shareholders' wealth. 36 The Honorable
Leo Stine argues that corporate directors usually have much discretion in how to pursue the
interests of stockholders, but, in the context of a company's sale, the sole focus must be on getting
the highest price for the sale. 37 The argument regarding whether corporations have the singular
duty to maximize shareholder profits continues. However, there has been a growing movement to
acknowledge alternative corporate purposes beyond the concept of profit maximization.
Maryland led the charge of this social movement in 2010 and became the first state to adopt
a statute creating a benefit corporation as a possible business entity. 38 As defined by most statutes,
a benefit corporation is similar to a traditional corporation but legally has committed to a social
purpose, accountability, and transparency. 39 Following in Maryland's footsteps, thirty-five states
have adopted benefit corporation legislation, and ten states have adopted flexible purpose
corporation or low-profit limited liability corporation legislation. 40 Flexible purpose corporations

34

Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985).
36
Yosifon, supra note 17, at 187–94.
37
Honorable Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for A Clear-Eyed Understanding of the
Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 761, 773 (2015).
38
Alexander, supra note 18.
39
Loewenstein, supra note 19, at 382.
40
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-36-101 to -401 (West 2020); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-2401 to -2442 (West
2020); CAL. CORP. CODE § 14600 et seq. (West 2020) (benefit corporation) and Cal. Corp. Code § 2500 et seq. (West
2020) (special purpose corporations); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-101-501 to -509 (West 2020); D.C. CODE §§ 291301.01 to 29-1304.01 (West 2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361 to 368 (West 2020); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 607.601
to 607.613 (West 2020); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 420D-1 to 420D-13.805 (West 2020); ID. CODE ANN. §§ 30-2001 to
2013 (West 2020); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 40/1 to 40/5.01 (West 2020); IN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1.3-1-1 to 10-5
(West 2020); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. XXIII, Ch. 271B et seq. (West 2020); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1801 to 1832
(West 2020); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, §§ 1 to 16 (West 2020); MD. CODE ANN., Corps. & Ass’ns. §§ 5-6C01 to 08 (West 2020); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 13-C, § 1801 to 1832 (West 2020); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 304A.001 to
304A.301 (West 2020); MT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-1401 to -1412 (West 2020); NE. REV. STAT. Ann. §§ 21-401 to 21414 (West 2020); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 78B.010-190 (West 2020); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-C:1 to C:13
(West 2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:18-1 to :18-11 (West 2020); N.Y. BUS. CORP. Law §§ 1701 to 1709 (West
2020); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1201 to 1210 (West 2020); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 60.750 to 770 (West 2020);
35
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are similar to benefit corporations but have eased qualifying and reporting requirements. 41 Lowprofit limited liability corporations simplify compliance with Internal Revenue Service rules for
program-related investments and act as a midpoint between non-profit and for-profit investing. 42
Even though benefit corporations, flexible purpose corporations, and low-profit limited liability
corporations remain for-profit entities, these corporate structures explicitly allow for the pursuit of
public benefits in addition to shareholders' profits, promote increased transparency, and strengthen
accountability. However, benefit corporations, flexible purpose corporations, nor low profit
limited liability corporations get tax benefits from the IRS like the tax-exemption for 501c(3)s.
B.

Model Legislation for Benefit Corporations
B Lab is a non-profit company that has worked towards uniformity across the states'

varying benefit corporation legislation. 43 B Lab created model legislation (Model Legislation),
and, while not all benefit corporation statutes directly incorporated the model legislation, most
have been influenced by it. 44 B Lab's Model Legislation was created to maximize the advantages
of expertise, by taking into account input from the states and business leaders; consistency, by
uniformity between states; conformity, by adapting benefit corporation legislation to fit within the

15 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 3301 to 3331 (West 2020); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 7-5.3-1 to -13 (West 2020); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 33-38-110 et seq. (West 2020); TN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-28-101 to -109 (West 2020); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE
ANN. §§ 21.951 to 21.959 (West 2020); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 16-10B-101 to -402 (West 2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
11A, §§ 21.01 to .08 (West 2020); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-782 to -791 (West 2020); WASH. REV. CODE §§
23B.25.005 to .150 (West 2020); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 31F-1-101 to -501 (West 2020); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 204.101
to .401 (West 2020).
41

Derek A. Ridgway, Flexible Purpose Corporation vs. Benefit Corporation, HANSONBRIDGETT (Sept. 4,
2012), https://www.hansonbridgett.com/Publications/articles/2012-09-flexible-purpose?pdf=1.
42
Caryn Capriccioso, Rick Zwetsch, Erin Shaver, Who is the L3C Entrepreneur?, INTERSECTOR PARTNERS,
1,
12
(2012),
https://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/downloads/Who%20is%20the%20L3C%20Entrepreneur_Fal
l%202012rfs.pdf.
43
Loewenstein, supra note 19, at 381.
44
Id. at 382.
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structure of traditional corporate code; and economic development, by giving investors and social
enterprise the tools they need to succeed. 45
The Model Legislation requires that a benefit corporation include a purpose clause in its
articles of incorporation, creating a general public benefit that has a positive impact on society or
the environment. 46 Additionally, the Model Legislation requires a benefit corporation to produce
an annual report explaining how the benefit corporation pursued that general public benefit. 47 The
report must be issued to shareholders, made available on the company's web site, and reported to
the Secretary of State in the company's state of incorporation. 48 Many states have modified the
reporting requirements of the Model Legislation by altering how often entities must create the
report or by mandating that the report only be produced to shareholders and not the general
public. 49
For publicly-traded benefit corporations, the Model Legislation requires that the annual
report include an opinion from an independent Benefit Director. 50 The opinion must address
whether the benefit corporation acted in pursuit of its general public purpose and whether the
directors and officers contemplated the impact of their actions. 51 If the Benefit Director determines
that the entity did not act in accordance with its stated public purpose or the directors failed to
contemplate the impact of their decisions, then the Benefit Director identifies the contributing
circumstances in the report. 52 Additionally, the Model Legislation provides for a benefit
enforcement proceeding wherein shareholders may state a claim for failure of the benefit

45

The Model Legislation, B LAB, https://benefitcorp.net/attorneys/model-legislation (last visited Nov. 14,

2020).
46

Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 20, at § 201(a).
Id. at § 401(a).
48
Id. at § 402.
49
Loewenstein, supra note 19, at 385.
50
Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 20, at § 302(c).
51
Id. at § 401.
52
Id.
47
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corporation to pursue its general public purpose or any specific public purpose as included in the
corporation's articles. 53
In states that have adopted the entire Model Legislation, the benefit enforcement
proceeding is the exclusive remedy against the benefit corporation, its directors, or officers for
these claims. 54 However, for reasons explained below, benefit enforcement proceedings lack
genuine force, and are therefore illusory. 55
There are three primary reasons why most states' enforcement provisions lack
effectiveness. First, it is unlikely that a board of directors would authorize a non-monetary action
against itself. 56 Second, when a shareholder brings a benefit enforcement proceeding the board of
directors of the benefit corporation is entitled to appoint a special litigation committee to consider
the action or determine how the matter should be resolved, and the business judgment rule makes
it unlikely a shareholder would succeed in a derivative suit. 57 Third, no cause of action is created
for the persons with the most incentive to sue the benefit corporation, the beneficiaries of its
claimed public interest. 58
C.

Shareholder Enforcement of a Benefit Corporation's Public Purposes
In light of these hurdles, it is unsurprising that there has been no litigation around benefit

enforcement proceedings to date. Of the benefit enforcement legislation enacted thus far, Hawaii
has arguably come closest to allowing a benefit corporation to be held accountable. Hawaii altered
the Model Legislation to provide shareholders and directors the express power to enforce public

53

Id. at § 305.
Loewenstein, supra note 19, at 387.
55
Id. at 388.
56
Id. at 387.
57
Id. at 388.
58
Id.
54
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benefit purposes, corporate purposes, and the director standard of conduct. 59 In Hawaii, directors
must consider how each of their actions affects shareholders and the pursuit of the corporation's
stated public benefits. 60 Even so, beneficiaries remain barred from bringing suit.
As discussed below, there have been several suggestions to strengthen benefit corporation
law that would enable a benefit corporation's general public purpose and specific public purpose
to be enforced.
Another potential option may be to empower a state's Attorney General, an office that
historically has served as the state's implicit guardian of charity, to remedy breaches of fiduciary
duties under a tradition grounded in English common law, parens patriae. 61 While political and
financial considerations may hinder enforcement through the state's Attorney General 62, parens
patriae could be adapted to enforce follow-through with the stated public purposes of benefit
corporations.
Under B Lab's Model Legislation, it is challenging for shareholders to state a claim because
the only cause of action is derived from the benefit enforcement proceeding. However, if benefit
corporation law were strengthened or the Attorney General was permitted to bring action against
a benefit corporation as the implicit guardian of charity, enforcement would be possible, and the
business judgment rule would no longer prevent any enforcement of a benefit corporation's public
purposes.

59
Lyman Johnson, Emerging Issues in Social Enterprise: Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and
Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 269, 289 (2013).
60
Id.
61
Joseph Mead & Michael Pollack, Courts, Constituencies, and the Enforcement of Fiduciary Duties in the
Nonprofit Sector, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 297 (2016).
62
Id.
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D.
Proposed Solutions for the Lack of Shareholder Recourse When a Benefit Corporation
Fails to Purse its Stated General or Specific Public Purposes
The proper balance between corporate profit maximization and the pursuit of public
benefits has not been struck. 63 In keeping with the general tenets of corporation law, the Model
Legislation states that a shareholder who wishes to pursue derivative litigation against the benefit
corporation must first take his or her demand to the board of directors. 64 The business judgment
rule protects a refusal by the board to comply with the demand. 65 The business judgment rule
provides:
[A] director and her decision are protected from legal attack if: first, she and her
colleagues made a judgment or decision; second, the decision makers were free
from disabling conflicts of interest; third, they exercised some (not necessarily
reasonable) care in informing themselves about the matter decided; and fourth, they
had a rational (not necessarily reasonable) basis for the decision they made. 66
If a shareholder seeks to compel a benefit corporation to comply with its general or specific public
purpose by way of the benefit enforcement proceeding, the benefit corporation's directors will
likely offer a reasonable explanation as to why or how they are pursuing the stated public purpose.
This explanation will be protected by the business judgment rule. 67 This leaves the shareholder in
the same position as before the benefit enforcement proceeding, with no way to ensure his or her
investment is being used in line with the stated public purpose. Legal scholars have offered
multiple solutions to this problem. 68

63

Stephen I. Glover et al., A Corporate Paradigm Shift: Public Benefit Corporations, GIBSON DUNN (Aug.
9, 2016), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/documents
/Corporate-Paradigm-Shift-Public-Benefit-Corporations.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MUQ-8H29.]
64
Loewenstein, supra note 20, at 388.
65
Id.
66
Douglas M. Branson, The Rule That Isn’t a Rule- The Business Judgment Rule, 36 VALPARAISO U. L. REV.
631, 635 (2002).
67
See Gerard V. Mantese & Emily S. Fields, The Business Judgment Rule, Mich. B.J., January 2020, at 31–
32 (explaining the common application of the business judgment rule).
68
Lee, supra note 21, at, 1096.
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Some propose the abandonment of the benefit corporation structure altogether. 69 Kent
Greenfield, professor at Boston College Law School, suggests scrapping the entire idea of benefit
corporations in favor of electing government officials who are willing to make the duties owed by
all corporations clear and enforceable.

70

Additionally, Phil Peters, co-chair of the Corporation

Committee of the California Bar, suggests focusing on flexible purpose corporations, an alternative
to traditional corporations and benefit corporations available in California that provides
shareholders more control over a benefit corporation's pursuit of its public purpose. 71
Other solutions focus on strengthening benefit corporation law to allow more remedies as
a check on corporate action.

72

For example, stakeholders who can show injury to a legitimate

interest could be granted standing. 73 The burden would then shift to the board of the benefit
corporation to show a legitimate corporate purpose. 74 If that burden is met, then the burden would
shift back to the stakeholder to show that the directors have less injurious means of achieving the
same ends. 75 Additionally, procedural requirements may be strengthened by imposing dividend
caps, requiring the benefit corporation to identify the stakeholders it seeks to serve, and requiring
transparency in the extent to which its social purpose is considered when making business
decisions 76 Accountability provisions in current benefit corporation law could also be improved
by uniformly requiring an expansive approach to the position of Benefit Director and requiring
that, as the entity grows, additional benefit directors will be added. 77

69

Leslie Brokaw, The “Benefit Corporation” Movement, MIT SLOAN MGNT. REV. (Nov. 28, 2012),
https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/the-benefit-corporation-movement/.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Steven Munch, Improving the Benefit Corporation: How Traditional Governance Mechanisms Can
Enhance the Innovative New Business Form, 7 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL'Y 170, 190 (2012).
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 190–191.
76
Munch, supra note 72, at 191.
77
Id. at 193.
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Even if the law is strengthened, the government begins to hold all corporations responsible,
or flexible purpose corporations are utilized, the question of determining liability in the face of the
business judgment rule remains. Jamie Lee, from Cornell Law School, offers the following quasimathematical equation as a proposal for determining whether a court should impose liability in a
benefit enforcement proceeding.
(Kind of Benefit)(Profit)(Time)
(Time Lag of Benefit) 78
"Kind of Benefit" refers to the size and kind of the social benefit pursued. 79 "Profit" refers to an
average of the net positive income that a benefit corporation has collected since its origin. 80 "Time"
refers to the life of the benefit corporation. 81 "Time Lag of Benefit" refers to the length of time
needed for the benefit to be realized. 82 A court would weigh the factors realizing that some public
benefits are more important than others, and profitability takes time. 83
All the solutions to increase the accountability of benefit corporations to the social purpose
above are viable but require the adoption of new laws and new processes of enforcement. Even so,
these solutions are still limited to shareholders bringing suit without the possibility of recovering
damages. As discussed below, one established alternative avoids the deterring effect of the lack of
damages and increases the likelihood of corporate accountability by placing the reigns of
enforcement in governmental hands.

78

Lee, supra note 21, at 1096.
Lee, supra note 21, at 1096.
80
Id. at 1097.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
79
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IV. MAXIMIZING THE BENEFIT CORPORATION FOR SOCIALLY CONSCIOUS INVESTORS
In 2014, Arkansas adopted the benefit corporation legislation based mainly on B Lab's
model legislation. 84 However, benefit corporation legislation in Arkansas has not significantly
been utilized. 85 While there is a good argument that this underutilization is due to traditional
corporations' ability to pursue purposes outside of profit maximization, the benefit corporation
legislation still has a definite purpose. The real value of the benefit corporation legislation in
Arkansas is to allow socially conscious investors an avenue to ensure that their investment is being
put to the purpose a corporation claims it is pursuing. However, the problem remains that the
benefit enforcement proceeding is the sole cause of action. 86 The benefit enforcement proceeding
alone is not likely to comfort socially conscious individuals. Electing an attorney general who will
enforce a benefit corporation's public purpose under the doctrine of parens patriae would begin to
give investors adequate assurances their desired pursuit of public purposes would be enforced.
More reliable assurances could come from encouraging the adoption of a quasi-poison pill that
allows shareholders to purchase severely discounted shares of the corporation in the event that the
benefit corporation's board decides to change its general or specific public purposes.
A.

Benefit Corporations in Arkansas
Arkansas enacted benefit corporation legislation in 2014. 87 However, in the six years since

the adoption of benefit corporation legislation in Arkansas, only a total of thirteen benefit
organizations have incorporated under the act. 88 To understand why more entrepreneurs in
Arkansas are not taking advantage of the legislation and why the slow start is expected and benign,
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it is important to examine the arguments for and against benefit corporations. This examination
requires attention to the necessity of benefit corporation legislation and what purpose such
legislation plays in the broader legal landscape.
As discussed above, the benefit corporation legislation exists to allow an entity to pursue
both social goals and shareholder profits. The Arkansas Benefit Corporation Act does precisely
that by stating, "a benefit corporation shall have a purpose of creating a general public benefit." 89
A general public benefit is defined as "a material positive impact on society and the environment,
taken as a whole, assessed against a third-party standard, from the business and operations of a
benefit corporation." 90 The Arkansas Benefit Corporation Act also allows a corporation to declare
a specific public purpose; however, this declaration does not obviate the corporation's adherence
to its general public purpose. 91
Additionally, the Arkansas Benefit Corporation Act requires benefit corporation directors
to consider the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders, including, but not limited to,
employees, the workforce in the supply chain, customers, and the environment. 92 The Act also
makes clear that directors are not to be held personally liable for monetary damages arising from
the failure of the benefit corporation to pursue general or specific public benefits. 93 Shareholders
may only avail themselves of the benefit enforcement proceeding if a benefit corporation fails to
create or pursue its stated general or specific public purposes. 94
Critics contend that benefit corporations are unnecessary and complicate the legal
landscape. The debatable necessity of benefit corporation legislation is really an offshoot of the
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argument regarding whether shareholder profit maximization is dicta or settled law. 95 Critics of
benefit corporation legislation point out that traditional corporations can—and do—pursue
agendas outside profit maximization. 96 An example of a traditional corporation pursuing public
benefits in Arkansas is Tacos 4 Life. Tacos 4 Life, a Central Arkansas based Limited Liability
Corporation (LLC), was founded with the mission that for every taco, rice bowl, quesadilla, salad
or nachos purchased, a hungry child receives a meal. 97 There are even independent standards for
interested parties to measure a company's corporate social responsibility (CSR). 98 Corporations
commonly release CSR reports of their own accord.
Some claim that benefit corporation legislation legitimizes the arguments that shareholder
maximization is law and creates more uncertainty, not less. A strong argument has been made that
corporation law that uses the language "all lawful purposes" is sufficiently broad enough to allow
a business to pursue social ends. 99 This argument is augmented by highlighting the common
misunderstanding of cases involving shareholder primacy. Proponents say that the business
judgment rule allows directors ample leeway to justify CSR. 100 These criticisms lead some
opponents to assert that benefit corporation law does more damage than good. 101 The critics claim
that, by creating an alternative form of incorporation that mandates a general public purpose,
benefit corporation legislation has strengthened the argument that a traditional corporation acting
on a social motivation is inappropriate. 102
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The business judgment rule in Arkansas is a presumption that the officers of a corporation
acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in an honest belief that their actions were in the best
interest of the corporation. 103 The business judgment rule neither asserts that all decisions by
corporate officers must be in the interest of maximizing profit, nor does it exclude social,
environmental, or economic motivations as legitimate. The broad interpretation of the business
judgment rule is supported by the social undertakings of businesses such as Tacos 4 Life discussed
above. 104
These arguments fail to see the true value of benefit corporation legislation: the ability for
socially conscious shareholders to ensure that their investments are being used not only for returns
but also to pursue the public benefits claimed by a business entity.
The failure to see the actual value of benefit corporation legislation accentuates the
argument that the sole cause of action, a benefit enforcement proceeding, is illusory. But, if the
Attorney General will adopt his or her rightful role as the state's implicit guardian of charity, and
if benefit corporations start to offer a quasi-poison pill that allows current shareholders to be
offered shares at a severely discounted price in the event a board wishes to change its general or
specific public purposes, socially conscious investing would find a home in Arkansas.
B.

Parens Patriae
Benefit corporation legislation is necessary and helpful.

In Arkansas, The Benefit

Corporation Act is necessary because it provides a way for shareholders to enforce the creation
and pursuit of a general public purpose and may provide the State Attorney General with an avenue
of enforcement under parens patriae.
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The concept of parens patriae is a remnant of the English constitutional system. 105 As the
constitutional system developed, the King retained certain powers. 106 Initially, the doctrine of
parens patriae acknowledged the King's capacity to act as a parent to the country, including the
capacity to act as superintendent to all charitable uses. 107 The doctrine of parens patriae was
brought as part of the English legal system to the American colonies and subsequently adopted
into the common law of the United States. 108 Parens patriae in the United States generally
recognizes that the State, usually through its Attorney General, is the ultimate beneficiary of
charitable trusts. 109 As such, the Attorney General has the authority to enforce the public benefit
of a non-profit organization or the terms of a charitable trust. 110 However, in some states, the
power to represent the public's interest is left to the district attorneys. 111 In either case, the state,
through the Attorney General or district attorneys, is the primary guardian of charity. 112 Some
states have codified the attorney general's role as the public's guardian of charity either by statute
or in the enumeration of the powers of the attorney general. 113 However, the majority of states
still rely on the common law's recognition of the attorney general as the implicit guardian of
charity. 114
The doctrine of parens patriae could be applied by Arkansas' Attorney General, or any other
individual state's Attorney General, to enforce the general and specific public purposes of benefit
corporations. Just like the public is the end beneficiary of the public purpose of non-profit entities,
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the public will be the beneficiary of the stated general and specific public purposes of benefit
corporations, flexible purpose corporations, and low-profit limited liability corporations. The
Attorneys General of each state are charged as the implicit guardians of charity through the
doctrine of parens patriae, 115 and it does not matter if that charity comes from non-profit or forprofit sources. If a benefit enforcement suit is unavailable or unsuccessful, shareholders could turn
to the Attorney General of Arkansas, or any other state where the benefit corporation, flexible
purpose corporation, or low-profit limited liability corporation is incorporated, to enforce the
stated general or specific public purposes. For the Attorney General of a state to enforce a public
purpose on a benefit corporation, flexible purpose corporation, or low-profit limited liability
corporation, all that is needed is political will.
C.

Quasi- Poison Pill
An additional risk for a social impact investor in a benefit corporation is that a benefit

corporation can alter its general or specific public purposes. 116 This amendment can take place
with a minimum status vote. 117 However, encouraging benefit corporations to adopt a quasi-poison
pill would discourage this practice.
Poison pills are defensive measures historically used in an attempt to stop the hostile
takeover of a corporation. 118 Typically poison pills work by attaching latent rights to each share of
a corporation's stock. 119 When a triggering event occurs, usually the purchase 15% to 20% of a
company's outstanding shares, the dormant rights are activated, and the holder is allowed to
purchase new shares in the corporation at a highly discounted rate. 120 A vital stipulation to poison
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pills is the person triggering the pill is not allowed to exercise his or her rights to purchase the
discounted shares. 121 This exception results in the dilution of the triggering party's ownership. 122
There is a two-part test developed in Unocal, applied in judicial review of a decision to
activate a poison pill in the event of an attempted hostile takeover. 123 First, directors must show
they reasonably believed a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed. 124 The court then
determines if the pill was a reasonable measure in relation to the threat. 125
Not every poison pill case involves an attempted avoidance of a hostile takeover. In Versata
Enterprises., Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., a poison pill was successfully used in a non-takeover situation
involving the protection of corporate assets. 126 However, in eBay, 127 a poison pill failed in an
attempt to protect corporate assets. 128 Joseph Grieco makes a strong argument that had the court
in eBay viewed the action as an attempt to protect corporate assets, the directors' decisions to
implement the poison pill would have been upheld. 129 Grieco additionally argues that the Unocal
standard was adopted to assess the use of a poison pill in the event of a hostile takeover, not in
internal events, and it should not apply in such cases. 130
In order to avoid the possibility of a benefit corporation arbitrarily amending its general or
specific public purposes, Arkansas businesses should adopt a quasi-poison pill. This simple
measure recognizes that a stated public purpose is a corporate asset. The quasi-poison pill would
be triggered in the event of a proposed amendment to a benefit corporation's general or specific
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public purposes. Triggering the quasi-poison pill would allow a dissenting shareholder to purchase
more shares, at a steeply discounted rate, thereby increasing his or her voting power. Effectively
thwarting any amendment that does not comport with the collective will of the shareholders.
The purpose of the benefit corporation legislation is to give shareholders the power of
public benefit enforcement and to give corporations the explicit freedom to pursue purposes other
than shareholders' profits. The Benefit Corporation Act also requires that benefit corporations
report annually on how they have worked towards their general public purpose. 131 Benefit
corporations being required to pursue their public purposes does not mean that traditional
corporations cannot participate in CSR. It means that benefit corporations must and that they must
be transparent in doing so.
Not all agree that having an option to incorporate in a form that requires CSR is a good
thing. Some fear that having two categories of companies is a problem. 132 This fear highlights the
importance of public perception. Whereas a benefit corporation may be favored on that designation
alone, traditional companies might receive public condemnation in the absence of a benefit
corporation designation despite those companies' legitimate CSR efforts. 133 Critics fear that benefit
corporations will use their designation as a disingenuous marketing strategy, and the legislation
does not have a built-in mechanism to evaluate whether companies are exploiting their existence
as benefit corporations. 134
Again, this concern is without merit. The Arkansas Benefit Corporation Act does not make
people more likely to view traditional business as bad per se. Instead, the act allows companies
and their shareholders the opportunity to be committed to a public benefit in addition to profit. If
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investors and consumers are drawn to benefit corporations, then the legislation is doing exactly
what it was created to accomplish—providing a framework for more socially conscious investing
and consuming. Additionally, while the legislation may lack a built-in mechanism to evaluate
whether companies are exploiting the benefit corporation legislation, the Attorney General can,
and should, fill the gap as the guardian of charity under parens patriae.
V. CONCLUSION
Regardless of whether shareholder profit maximization is a requirement of the law or
simple outdated dicta, it is no longer the singular purpose of all for-profit business. There is money
in morality, and more and more people are investing in socially conscious businesses. While some
traditional corporate structures are being utilized for social purposes, the creation and adoption of
benefit corporations, flexible purpose corporations, and low-profit limited liability corporations
have provided a framework for entities to explicitly pursue more than just profit. 135 However, the
mechanisms in place currently do not offer stakeholder sufficient means with which to enforce a
benefit corporation's stated general or specific public purposes. 136 There are many ideas about how
to strengthen the law to better hold benefit corporations, flexible purpose corporations, and lowprofit limited liability corporations accountable.
Nevertheless, a suitable way to strengthen the power of social investors already exists, but
it must be utilized: Each state's Attorney General is the implicit guardian of charity as prescribed
by the common law doctrine of parens patriae. 137 All that is necessary is the political will to apply
that doctrine to the enforcement of stated general and specific public purposes. 138 Furthermore, if
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benefit corporations adopted a quasi-poison pill, investors would receive protection from shifting
public purposes. In Arkansas, The Benefit Corporation Act adds to the legal landscape because,
although traditional corporations are free to pursue purposes outside of profit maximization,
benefit corporation legislation builds the foundation for shareholders to hold companies
accountable for how they pursue public purposes. What is left is to strengthen enforcement of a
benefit corporation's accountability towards its stated public purpose through the doctrine of
parens patriae and the encouragement of a new adoption of a poison pill.
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